The improbable Syrian reactor

(image of North Korean Yongbyon reactor site from BBC, 7/23/07)

Sanger and Manzetti, NYT:

Israel’s air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports.

This report seems suspicious to me. Here’s one point from the Sanger/Manzetti article:

The partly constructed Syrian reactor was detected earlier this year by satellite photographs, according to American officials. They suggested that the facility had been brought to American attention by the Israelis, but would not discuss why American spy agencies seemed to have missed the early phases of construction.

They also say that the North Koreans were giving instruction on how to build a reactor like that at Yongbyon– a 5 Megawatt reactor.

A 5 MW reactor is big. From the satellite photo, once can see that the Yongbyon site is 4500 x 2500 m, or roughly 2.5 mi x 1.5 mi. The reactor building is very roughly 250 x 450 m. It consumes massive amounts of fuel: 110 tons of spent fuel per year. John Pike’s GlocalSecurity thinks that the satellite imagery of a uranium enrichment facility might be missed. In my opinion, the large amount of ore required would not be, especially considering that Syria doesn’t have good ore sources (it does have a site which extracts uranium from phosphate at Homs, but the uranium is a contaminant; see Glocal Security below).

Syria is reported to have >reached an agreement to construct a 25MW light water reactor, but it is not known whether construction has proceeded. These are not practically capable under reasonable oversight of producing material for weapons.[Updated 10/17 thanks to suggestions from reader Pdq; changes indicated in bold]

Global Security expressed skepticism in this manner:

• “dramatic satellite imagery” – the types of activity associated with nuclear weapons development, particularly at the early stages of the program, are precisely the sorts of things that are not going to produce dramatic satellite imagery, which is why North Korea’s uranium program is so vexing for the United States.
• “primarily from Israel” – the reliance on such liasion sourced intelligence that could not be independently verified was one of the central problems with the Iraq WMD intelligence failure, and either evidence is “primarily from Israel” [ie, HUMINT] or it is independ[en]tly knowable by the United States based on “dramatic satellite imagery” but it is difficult to comprehend how both statements could be true.
• “restricted to a few senior officials” – this part of the story is designed to explain to other reporters why their sources are unable to confirm any of the details of this report
• “arrival at the Syrian port of Tartus” – this is not a large facility, and this news story would have us believe that Israeli intelligence has intimate knowledge of unloading activities at this port, a collection capability that was willingly compromised here
• “labeled as cement” — cement is normally transported as a bulk powder, and less frequently in recent decades in bags — neither form of transport would usefully conceal nuclear related components, and labeling some other means of transport [eg, standard 40-foot containters] as cement would be so patently false as to immediately draw suspicion to the shipment.
• “on the Euphrates River, close to the Turkish border” — the implication, though not over assertion, is that over the course of three days Israeli intelligence was able to track the shipment as it travelled half-way across Syria, or that Israeli surveillance of Syria is so comprehensive that the shipment was detected upon arrival — either of which is very impressive and hard to believe.
• “using it to extract uranium from phosphates” – Syria has a phosphate industry, which supports the production of fertilizer and phosphoric acid. Between 1996 and 2001 Syria operated a pilot plant at Homs for the purification of phosphoric acid, in order to remove the uranium contanmination so that the phosphoric acid could be used for food processing. This project was financed by the UN Developement Program, supported by the IAEA, and not bombed by Israel.

So, count me as unconvinced. There’s clearly a lot of BS being circulated by the WaPo and the NYT.